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THE STERILIZATION RIGHTS OF
MENTAL RETARDATES
The United States Constitution implicitly guarantees the right of
privacy.1 \The right of privacy specifically includes the right not to procreate, or the right to sterilization procedures.2 Ordinarily, only the individual may exercise his right to sterilization.' Whether a particular indiSee Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing history of Supreme Court's
recognition of constitutional right of privacy). While the Constitution does not mention explicitly an individual's right of privacy, the Supreme Court originally inferred the existence
of the right in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Boyd Court held that the
fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments protected an individual's home and privacies of
life as the essence of constitutional liberty and security. Id. Boyd began recognition of the
individual right to freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion, later known as the
right of privacy. See 410 U.S. at 152-53.
Subsequent decisions reaffirmed and expanded the constitutional right of privacy.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution guaranteed an individual's right to procreate
as an element of the right of privacy in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The
Court held that the right of privacy encompassed the right to personal autonomy over procreation and contraception. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The right to
contraception applies to individuals regardless of marital status or age. Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (age); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (martial status). The Constitution, therefore, guarantees every individual's right to
procreate and the corollary right not to procreate. Furthermore, the right is purely individual. See Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 55, 342 A.2d 574, 577 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975). The New Jersey Superior Court recognized Mr. Ponter's right to procreate, and
realized that his opposition to his wife's proposed sterilization arose because of the effect of
his spouse's sterilization on his right to procreate. Id. The Ponter court held, however, that
an individual's right to procreate or not developed independently of any other person's
similar right. Id. at 54, 342 A.2d at 576. The court granted Mrs. Ponter's right to be sterilized, even though her decision not to procreate indirectly determined her husband's right to
procreate. Id.
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme
Court
held that the right of privacy included personal autonomy over procreation and contraception. Id. Griswold concerned temporary contraception and not permanent sterilization. Id.
In a later decision, however, the Supreme Court implied that personal autonomy over contraception protected an individual's right to sterilization. See Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977). Invalidating New York's statutory limitation on minors' access to contraceptives, the Court stated that Carey applied to all forms of birth control,
presumably including sterilization. Id. at 684-88.
The Constitution further protects an individual's right to both therapeutic and elective sterilizations. See Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 1973);
note 45 infra.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognition of personal
autonomy over procreation and contraception); cf. Comment, Sterilization,Retardationand
ParentalAuthority, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 380, 382 nn.20 & 21 [hereinafter cited as Sterilization] (citing cases invalidating involuntary sterilization statutes on grounds of due process
or equal protection). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In Buck, the Supreme
Court upheld an involuntary sterilization statute that allowed the state to require sterilization of certain mental defectives. Id. at 206-07. With the Court's expansion of the right of
privacy to include the right to procreate, see note 2 supra, the Court effectively has over-
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vidual may exercise the right to sterilization depends upon that person's
capacity to consent.' Mental retardation generally deprives an individual
of the capacity to make an informed decision about sterilization and thus
exercise his sterilization rights.'
Although the majority of courts have declined to hear cases involving a mental retardate's right to be sterilized,6 a few courts have
ruled Buck.
The purpose and desirability of involuntary sterilizations continue to encite debate.
See generally Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal Ethical andSocial
Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 191-94 [hereinafter cited as Vukowich] (supporting
program of positive eugenics to upgrade world gene pool); Comment, Sterilization: Who
Says No?, 29 MERCER L. REV. 821, 822-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Who Says No?] (discussion of society's and individuals' interests in having retardates sterilized). Scientific studies
have failed to support the proposition that involuntary sterilization of retardates reduces
the incidence of retardation in the general population. See Ferster, Eliminatingthe Unift-Is
Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 602-04 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ferster];
Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631, 646-47 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Eugenic Sterilization].Eugenics, the process of encouraging reproduction of
individuals with "good qualities" and prohibiting reproduction of "social defectives,"
has fallen into disrepute. Eugenic Sterilization, supra,at 646-47. Medical researchers now
believe that only a very .few types of mental retardation automatically pass to the
retardate's offspring. Ferster, supra, at 602-04. Contra, Vukowich, supra, at 194. Further,
studies have shown that mental retardation does not preclude one from being a "good
parent." Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the
Sterilizationof HandicappedPersons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 1021 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Burgdorf] (citing authorities). These commentators have criticized Buck severely. See
Burgdorf, supra,at 977, 1006 (comparing Buck to Hitler's theory of eugenics embodied in his
concepts of master race and Aryan superiority); Ferster, supra, at 596 (stating that the
Supreme Court would reverse Buck if reheard today); Murdock, Sterilizationof the Retarded A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 921-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Murdock] (doubting validity of eugenics as a basis for sterilization).
'See Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent Voluntary
Sterilizationof the Mentally Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 447, 447, 448 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as Neuwirth].
I See id. at 448. At least two commentators suggest, however, that although lacking
legal competence, over 90% of all mental retardates have the capacity to consent to
sterilization. Murdock, supra note 3, at 933; Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 452. Courts often
confuse legal competence and the capacity to consent. Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 448.
Courts presume a person's legal competence unless that person is shown to be a minor or
suffering from some mental disability. Id. Capacity to consent concerns whether one can
comprehend the nature, quality, and effect of the sterilization procedure. Id.
8 See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 311-12 (Ala. 1979) (court had no power to
authorize sterilization absent specific legislative grant of jurisdiction); Guardianship of
Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704-05, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 268 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967
(1979) (court of general jurisdiction had no power to hear sterilization request); Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 762, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1974) (probate court had no
jurisdiction to authorize sterilization); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977) (judge
feared liability for ordering sterilization and therefore held court had no jurisdiction); A.L.
v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, _,
325 N.E.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1975) (applicable juvenile statute insufficient to confer jurisdiction); Homes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d
579, 580 (Ky. App. 1969) (neither statute nor common law conferred power to authorize
sterilization); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo. 1974) (no Missouri court had jurisdiction); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 394-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (no authority existed
under Texas Constitution or statutes). But see note 7 infra (minority of courts stating that
they have jurisdiction to authorize sterilization).
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recognized the retardate's right to sterilization.7 Two possible justifications exist for preserving a mental retardate's right to sterilization.
Sterilization may be in the retardate's best interest.' Alternatively,
others, such as society and the retardate's parents or guardian, may wish
to prevent reproduction by the retardate.9 Though the latter justification has received considerable criticism,'" retardation itself should not
preclude exercise of the right to sterilization, if sterilization best serves
the retardate's interests."
Mental retardation deprives the retardate himself of the ability to
exercise the right to sterilization.'2 Presumably, mental retardation
precludes the ability to understand the nature and quality of reproduction or sterilization, thereby negating any presumption of the capacity to
consent. Although at least two commentators claim otherwise," the
7 See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981) (court of general jurisdiction has
power to authorize sterilization of retardate as part of its parens patriaepower); In re A.W.,
No. 80-9A-175, slip op. at 25 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1981) (court has power to authorize
sterilization of minor retardate in absence of limiting legislation); In re Penny N., 120 N.H.
269, -,
414 A.2d 541, 542 (1980) (per curiam) (jurisdiction conferred by broadly construed
statute); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 239, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (1981) (court of general jurisdiction
had authority to hear case); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991
(Sup. Ct. 1976) (common law parens patriae jurisdiction gave court power to authorize
sterilization); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 233, 608 P.2d 635, 638 (1980) (court had jurisdiction absent limiting legislation); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 548, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881,
885, 896 (1981) (court's jurisdiction plenary); note 59 infra (defining parens patriae power).
See In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98,123, 405 A.2d 851, 864 (Super. Ct. Ch.Div. 1979),
vacated on othergrounds, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). The lower court recognized that,
for the retardate, social interaction without fear of pregnancy and increased need for supervision might outweigh the right to procreate, and therefore, the retardate's best interests
might dictate sterilization. Id. at 236, 405 A.2d at 866.
9 See Vukowich, supra note 3, at 190-91 (calling for involuntary sterilizations to improve society's quality of life and chance of continued survival); Who Says No?, supra note
3, at 822-29 (discussing spousal and societal interests affected by sterilization). Involuntary
sterilization by definition entails satisfying the interests of someone other than the person
sterilized. See Vukowich, supra note 3, at 190-91. Vukowich argues that society's interest in
healthy and intelligent offspring to carry on the human race dictates adoption of a sterilization program to reduce or eliminate the effect of "deficient genes" in the population. Id.
"0See Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 997, 1006; Murdock, supra note 3, at 921-24; Sterilization, supra note 3, at 382 nn.20 & 21.
" See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981). The court favored
preservation of retardates' rights to sterilization. Id. Inability to choose between sterilization and procreation should not result in the forfeit of the right to sterilization because the
right to sterilization is a valuable part of the right of privacy. Id.
12 Holmes v. Power, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. 1969) (mental incompetence or retardation negates legal capacity to consent).
," See note 5 supra.Over 90% of all retardates are at most only mildly retarded. Murdock, supranote 3, at 934. The classification of "mildly retarded" includes the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) range of 52-67, slightly below the "borderline normal" score of
80. MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION INMENTAL RETARDATION 18 (H. Grossman
ed. 1973 rev.). Mild retardation generally leaves the retardate educable. Id. Mildly retarded
adults usually can maintain themselves independently or semi-independently in a community. Id. at 134. Arguably, if a retardate can function independently, he should have the
capacity to make decisions about procreation and sterilization. See S. HAAVIK & K. MENNINGER, SEXUALITY, LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON 138-42 (1981). The
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courts generally hold that mental retardation bars effective legal consent." Further, many courts hold that mere minority voids the ability to
consent, 5 especially to elective surgery." Consequently, mentally retarded minors face dual incompetence when attempting to consent to a
sterilization procedure.
Faced with personal incapacity to consent to sterilization the retardate's concern becomes whether someone else may consent in the retardate's behalf. Three possible alternative sources of consent to retardate sterilization exist."8 Parents, 19 guardians ad litem," and the
authors discuss the showing required to prove valid consent by a retardate, implying that
some retardates can consent to sterilization. Id. But see note 14 infra.
See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Conn. 1978) (hospital required consent
of retardate's parents for any surgical procedure, and court presumed the validity and
necessity of consent requirement); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C.
1974), final disposition, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as moot per curiam, 565
F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court referred to nearly universal common-law and statutory rule
that mental incompetents or retardates cannot consent to medical operations); Frazier v.
Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (court stated without support that retardate
lacked capacity to consent). But see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (emphasis placed on fact that retardate did not consent but
rather expressed opposition to sterilization implying that retardate could consent).
11 See Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 452. Neuwirth sets forth the majority rule that a
minor does not have the ability to consent, but also discusses the minority view that, depending on the degree of independence, a minor may give effective consent to surgery in his
best interests. Id.
16 See id. Elective surgery does not meet the requirement of being in the best interests of the minor, id., because by definition elective surgery does not include therapeutic
surgery. See note 45 infra.
17 Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 452.
" See Recent Developments, Courts-Scope of Authority-Sterilizationof Mental Incompetents, 44 TENN. L. REV. 879, 882-86 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Courts' Authority]
(discussing possible bases of court's power to authorize sterilization of retardates). Some
states have specific statutes authorizing sterilization of retardates, but these statutes
generally apply only to institutionalized retardates. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp.
361, 363 (D. Conn. 1978) (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-569g (West 1977) (repealed
1979)) (retardate's difficulty in obtaining admission to state institution violated equal protection principles by denying noninstitutionalized retardates the right to sterilization); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1972); S.C. CODE § 44-47-10 (1976). At least one state has passed legislation allowing elective sterilization of any retardate, irrespective of whether the retardate
resides in a state institution. See VA. CODE §§ 54-325.10 to -325.12 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See
also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-128 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (allowing sterilization of retardates
after they reach the age of majority).
" See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978) (parent presented petition in an
earlier court proceeding to have sterilization authorized); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361,
364 (D. Conn. 1978) (parents claimed that parent-child relationship empowered the parents
to consent); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, -,
325 N.E.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 425
U.S. 936 (1975) (parental consent acceptable for medically necessary surgery only); In re
Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 296, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (parent applied for
order authorizing parental consent for sterilization).
' See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978)
(spendthrift guardian's consent not sufficient for sterilization); Guardianship of Tulley, 83
Cal. App. 3d 698, 700, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 267 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979) (general
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courts2' may attempt to consent in the retardate's behalf. Although two
recent state supreme court cases cast considerable doubt in the the
area, ' the majority of courts have held that absent express statutory
authority the courts lack jurisdiction to authorize sterilization."3 The
majority position effectively precludes the exercise of the retardate's
constitutional right to sterilization, because without valid personal consent or court authorization, an increasing number of doctors and
hospitals refuse to permit sterilizations.24
guardian applied for court authorization of sterilization); Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 758, 760, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65 (Cal. App. 1974) (parent sought appointment as
general guardian and then attempted to consent to ward's sterilization); In re Grady, 85 N.J.
235, 243,.426 A.2d 467, 470 (1981) (guardian ad litem represented retardate); Frazier v. Levi,
440 S.W.2d 393, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (application by general guardian); In re Hayes, 93
Wash. 2d 228, 229, 608 P.2d 635, 636 (1980) (mother of retardate sought appointment as
guardian ad litem to consent to sterilization).
A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court solely to represent a
party in a particular case. Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955) (Boldt,
J., concurring). Ad litem guardianship terminates at the close of litigation. Blackwell v.
Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103, 106-07 (E.D.S.C. 1956). A general guardianship,
however, lasts as long as the ward's disability continues. Id. at 106.
2 See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 310 (Ala. 1979) (petitioner sought to invoke
court's equity power to authorize sterilization); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 144 (Del. Ch.
1977) (court sympathized with petitioner but ruled that the court had no power to authorize
sterilization); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Mo. 1974) (petitioner sought court approval
of sterilization); see also cases cited in notes 19-20 supra (on application of parent or guardian for authorization to consent to sterilization, court usually considers whether the court
itself has power to authorize consent independent of parent's or guardian's consent).
I See text accompanying notes 63-73 infra (discussing In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607
(Alaska 1981), which found jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of a retardate); text accompanying notes 74-95 infra (discussing In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981), which
similarly found jurisdiction to authorize sterilization). The issue of sterilization of retardates
has grown considerably in importance for four reasons. First, medical advances prolong the
life expectancies of mental retardates, thereby lenthening the retardate's period of fertility,
and increasing the perceived need for sterilization. In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 103, 405
A.2d 851, 854 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979), vacated on othergrounds, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467
(1981). Second, the recent trend towards deinstitutionalization'of 'retardates results in
decreased supervision and increased parental concern over pregnancy. See In re Grady, 85
N.J. 235, 242, 426 A.2d 467, 469-70 (1981). In Grady, the parents of the retardate never institutionalized her. Id. The parents petitioned the court for authorization to sterilize the
retardate because of their fear of the retardate becoming pregnant upon her placement in a
group home for retarded adults. Id. See also Note, Stump v. Sparkman: The Scope of
Judicialand DerivativeImmunities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 107,

119 n.114 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Immunities]. Third, many states have repealed involuntary sterilization statutes, thereby presumably increasing demand for so-called voluntary
sterilizations. Id. at 119 n.112. Last, a number of recent cases and articles suggest that doctors and others face liability for involuntary and nonconsensual sterilizations, thereby increasing requests for court authorization. See Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 356 F. Supp. 380,
383 (S.D. Ohio 1973); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 242, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (1981); Holder, Voluntary Sterilization,225 J.A.M.A. 1743,1743-44 (1973); Note, Elective Sterilization,113 U. PA.
L. REv. 415, 425-39 (1965).
" See note 6 supra.
2 See, e.g., In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269,-, 414 A.2d 541, 542 (1980) (doctors refused to operate without court approval); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 242, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (1981)
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Speculation remains whether a doctor's reluctance toperform sterilizations solely at the retardate's request stems from concern for preservation of the retardate's right to procreate, fear of civil or criminal
liability for deprivation of the constitutional right to procreate, or other
legal uncertainties.25 Because the Constitution protects the right to procreate as a fundamental civil right, 6 a sterilized retardate may later
bring an action against the operating physician and hospital under sections 1981,1 1983,28 or 1985(3)29 of the Civil Rights Acts, which provide
private causes of action for deprivation of civil rights. 0 The majority of
actions against doctors and hospitals arise under section 1983."'
Although section 1983 proscribes deprivation of civil rights only
under color of state law,"2 the courts may reach private parties through
the parties' association with state actors.3 In Stump v. Spark(hospital refused to allow doctors to perform sterilization without court authorization);

Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (hospital officials required court
approval of the sterilization requested).
I See Ferster, supra note 3, at 620 (suggesting that physicians refuse to perform
sterilizations because of legal uncertainties).
See note 1 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1981 guarantees all citizens equal rights under the
laws of each state. Id.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Section 1983 establishes a private right of
action for violation of civil rights under color of state law. Id.; see Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 351 (1978); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. II 1979). Section 1985(3) establishes a private right of action for conspiracy to deprive a citizen of civil rights or equal protection. Id.; see, e.g.,
Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (court considered and dismissed plaintiff's § 1985(3) conspiracy claim for deprivation of the right to
procreate).
I See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961), overruled on other grounds, 436 U.S.
658, 663 (1978) (recognizing private cause of action under § 1983); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (private cause of action under § 1981).
"' See, e.g., note 28 supra. One reason that plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 more
often than either § 1981 or § 1985(3) in suits against doctors and hospitals could center on
the elements of a violation under each of the three sections. Section 1981 requires that the
racial discrimination be purposeful and against a certain class of people. Lee v. Washington
County Bd.- of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980). Section 19853) also requires
racially based class discrimination, and "all mental retardates" does not constitute t class
for § 1985(3) purposes. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380, 384 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
But see Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1980) (implying that a common interest may be enough to show a § 1985(3) class). Section 1983 does not require
discrimination against a class, but only deprivation of an individual's civil rights under color
of state law. See generally Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (setting forth
requirements for § 1983 claim).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
1 See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978)
(doctor liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of pervasive association with state-operated
hospital); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (hospital and
doctor acted together giving rise to joint liability under § 1983). Some courts have gone to
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man,' for example, plaintiff sought judgment against a doctor and
hospital under section 1983 based on the defendants' involvement in a
court authorized sterilization. 5 Plaintiff alleged that conspiracy between
a state judge who authorized sterilization under state statutes and the
doctor and hospital constituted a sufficient basis for liability under section 1983.3 Although the Supreme Court in Stump held that judicial immunity protected the judge, 7 and implied that the protection derivatively
covered the doctor and hospital, 8 future defendants may find such
derivative immunity unavailable, because Stump put future plaintiffs on
notice of the particularized pleading requirements for conspiracy under
section 1983.19 In part because of these continuing legal uncertainties,
some doctors refuse 40to rely on a retardate's attempted "consent" to perform a sterilization.
For similar reasons, doctors refuse to sterlize the retardate if the
parent attempts to consent to the operation.41 The parent generally attempts to authorize the operation based on the principles of common law
and the parent-child relationship.42 Because parents usually cannot show
great lengths to find that the state operated the hospital involved in the sterilization. See,
e.g., Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6-9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (court concluded that because hospital received 30% of funds from Medicare, and community substantially controlled hospital, hospital satisfied § 1983 state actor requirement); cf. Pennsylvania
v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (state appointed board to operate college, subjecting board's discriminatory act to fourteenth amendment prohibition); Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 635 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (substantial indirect governmental participation by appointment of several trustees of charitable foundation sufficient to constitute "state action" under § 1983).
31 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See generally Immunities, supra note 22 (detailed analysis of
Stump).
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 353 (1978).
See id at 364 n.13.

Id. at 364. The Stump Court limited itself to consideration of whether to hold the
judge liable for his part in authorizing the plaintiff's prior sterilization. Id. On remand, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, without leave to amend, of the § 1983 claim against the
doctor and hospital for failure to particularize the allegation of conspiracy between the doctor, the hospital, and the immune judge. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 269 (7th Cir.
1979).
1 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 n.13 (1978); Immunities, supra note 22, at
129-31 (discussing derivative immunity).
" See Immunities, supra note 22, at 131-32. Although Stump expanded judicial and
derivative immunity in § 1983 actions, proper pleadings may avoid dismissal under Stump.
Id.; see note 37 supra.
40 Ferster, supra note 3, at 620.
41 See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Conn. 1978) (hospital refused to accept
parental consent because no Connecticut statute authorized parental consent for sterilizations); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, -,
414 A.2d 541, 542 (1980) (doctors refused to perform sterilization without court approval); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 242, 426 A.2d 467, 470
(1981) (hospital refused to accept parental consent and required court approval).
2 See note 19 supra (parents attempting to consent). The common law vests a duty of
care for minors in the minors' parents. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 365 (D. Conn.
1978). This duty, arising out of the parent-child relationship, gives the parent some rights as
well as obligations. Id. Among the rights is the power to consent to medical treatment
necessary or advisable for the child's health. Id.
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any medical necessity for sterilization, courts generally have held that
neither parental authority nor the parent-child relationship enables the
parents to have the retardate sterilized.43 Parents have a common-law
duty to care for and protect their child, including a limited ability to
make medical and surgical decisions for the child without state interference. 4 This duty, however, does not extend to authorizing elective
sterilizations.45 Case law supports the conclusion that the child's con'3 See note 19 supra. Although ostensibly allowing parental consent, the Grady court
reserved a right of judicial review. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 251, 426 A.2d 467, 475
(1981). In effect, the court denied the parents' right to consent and substituted the court's
judgment. See note 86 infra.
" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972) (parents may make decisions, subject to state intervention if child's health or safety jeopardized); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651-52 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F.
Supp. 361, 365 (D. Conn. 1978).
"s Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978). The Ruby court held that
parents may neither veto nor give valid consent to the sterilization of their children. Id.
In the context of this article, "therapeutic sterilization" refers to those sterilizations
medically necessary because pregnancy would endanger the woman's life and alternative
forms of contraception would not provide the necessary degree of protection. For example,
in Hathaway, the plaintiff suffered high blood pressure and an umbilical hernia which
rendered further pregnancies unsafe. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 702
(1st Cir. 1973). Mrs. Hathaway's high blood pressure and irregular menstrual flow rendered
less drastic contraceptives ineffective or dangerous. Id. Therefore, her physician recommended sterilization as the only suitable means of contraception. Id. In this instance, protection of Mrs. Hathaway's life necessitated elimination of the risk of pregnancy, and
therapeutic sterilization was the only suitable means of contraception. Id.
Nontherapeutic, or elective, sterilizations include those undertaken as a family planning device, or for economic, social, eugenic, and hygienic reasons. Eugenic and social
sterilizations might result from a concern over the number of retardates coupled with a
belief in the inheritability of the specific affliction. See note 3 supra (discussion of eugenics
as a basis for involuntary sterilization). Parents may request sterilization of a dependent
retardate to stop menstrual flow with its attendant hygienic problems. See, e.g., Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 700, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 267 (1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S.
967 (1979).
The Hathaway court impliedly recognized the constitutional right of elective sterilization under the right of privacy, protected by the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. See 475 F.2d at 706. The court held that a hospital may not arbitrarily deny its facilities to individuals seeking sterilization if doctors perform elective surgery with similar risks
at the hospital. Id. But see Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1307 n.92 (1980). The validity of Hathaway is doubtful after Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Maher v. Roe Court held that denial of state Medicaid benefits
to pay for nontherapeutic abortions did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Id. at 474. Therefore, under Maher v. Roe, the retardate's ability to pay for
sterilization may determine his right to such surgery. See id.; 93 HARv. L. REV. at 1307 n.92.
Presumably states may deny funding of sterilizations as well as abortions and relegate the
retardate to the use of contraceptives as an alternative means of exercising the right not to
procreate. See 93 HARv. L. REV. at 1307 n.92. But see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684-88 (1977). The Carey Court held state limitations on the distribution of contraceptives to minors unconstitutional as violative of the fundamental right to prevent conception. Id. Four justices concurred in the reasoning that since a state could not interfere
with a minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy in the first trimester, a fortiori the state
could not interfere in the prevention of pregnancy. Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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stitutional right to procreate outweighs the parent's rights implicit in
the parent-child relationship, because courts refuse to authorize
sterilization of the retardate 8 A minority of cases and authorities suggest that the parent may consent,4 7 but the majority deny the parent's
right to do so. 8
The main argument against parental consent centers on the possible
conflict of interest between parent and child. 9 While some courts imply.
improper motives in the parent's petition to authorize sterilization, no
court has grounded a refusal or authorization on the basis of motive
alone. 0 Instead, the court usually appoints a guardian ad litem to repre' See note 6 supra (majority of cases deny sterilization authorization, thereby
perpetuating retardate's right to procreate).
" See Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (court found no
evidence that retardate's parents consented to retardate's sterilization, implying that
parents could consent); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. 1968) (court held that at
retardate's age, 35 years old, her parents could not consent for her, implying that parents
could have consented if retardate had been minor); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 42, 355 A.2d
647, 661, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (father may assert his daughter's constitutional
right of privacy if she cannot exercise that right).
" See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978) (parents may neither veto
nor give valid consent to the sterilization of their children); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App.
636, -. , 325 N.E.2d 501, 502, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1975) (common law does not invest
parents with power to consent to sterilization of their child); cf. North Carolina Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 456 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (holding unconstithtional a North Carolina statute investing power to start sterilization proceedings
against retardate in next of kin); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974),
final disposition,403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as moot per curiam, 565 F.2d 722
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (allowing retardate's "representative," which may be parent, to consent
could result in illegal involuntary sterilizations).
" See Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 455 (recommending court authorization to consent only
after adversary-proceeding because parent's interest may be directly opposite minor's interest).
11See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 311 (Ala. 1979) (sterlization in society's best
interests as opposed to retardate's interest because of 50% chance that retardate's child
would be retarded); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 608 (Alaska 1981) (sterilization in society's
best interests because of 50% chance that retardate's issue would have Downs Syndrome);
Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 700, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 267 (Cal. App. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979) (parent disliked having to cope with retarded daughter's
menstrual cycle); Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 760, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65-66
(Cal. App. 1974) (proper motive for sterilization because health of retardate would be impaired severely if she became pregnant, and improper financial motive that retardate's
family and/or the general public would be charged with the cost of supporting and maintaining retardate's offspring); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636,-, 325 N.E.2d 501, 502, cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1975) (sterilization to prevent impregnation of fellow retardates); In re
Flanary, 6 Fam. L. Rep. 2345, 2345 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1980) (hysterectomy requested solely to
stop menstrual flow); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Mo. 1974) (retardate would be
unable mentally and physically to care for child); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378
N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (retardate's personal hygiene and menstrual cycle must be
handled by her mother); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (application for order authorizing sterilization based on social and economic grounds only); In re
Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 230, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980) (proper motive for sterilization
because contraceptives potentially harmful in the long term).
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sent the retardate,51 effectively eliminating the potential danger of the
parent's selfish reasons influencing the decision." The presence of a
guardian ad litem affords some additional procedural safeguards' and
usually results in an adversary proceeding." Because the majority of
courts later dismiss the sterilization request for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction absent an express legislative grant of power to authorize
sterilizations,55 appointment of the guardian to assure an adequate hearing seems pointless.
After rejecting requests by the retardate, parents, and guardians ad
litem, the majority of courts have held that they themselves have no
jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of a mentally retarded minor.
Generally courts first consider whether any state statute expressly confers jurisdiction to hear a request for sterilization authorization. 5 Absent express legislative authority, judges consider alternative bases of
jurisdiction.5 ' The courts may have authority under the parens patriae
power of the court, 5 the doctrine of substituted judgment,"5 or a broad
51 See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 243, 426 A.2d 467, 470-71 (1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
2d 228, 231, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 543, 307 N.W.2d 881,
883 (1981). These recent cases did not follow the majority rule of finding no jurisdiction, but
instead ruled "against" the guardian ad litem by authorizing sterilization.
2 See Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 455. Guardians ad litem generally will consider only
the retardate's interests. Id. Freedom from the responsibility for the retardate, even if the
courts deny authorization for sterilization, assures that fear of the consequences of such
denial will not motivate the guardian's prayer for relief. Id.
See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981). Additional procedural safeguards necessary to insure due process include the authorization of the guardian ad litem to meet with the retardate to assure adequate representation. Id Also, the
guardian may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses to provide the court with all
the facts. Id.
' See, e.g., id at 243, 426 A.2d at 471 (because guardian ad litem advocated sterilization, full adversary proceeding did not result until court allowed public advocate and attorney general to intervene and act as putative guardians ad litem).
See note 6 supra.
See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 260-61, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981) (recognizing, but not
following, majority rule of no jurisdiction to authorize sterilization); note 6 supra.
" See Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66 (Cal. App.
1974).
See id (judge considered parens patriaepower and the probate court's general equity power); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990-91 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(court invoked parens patriae power); In re. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 232-33, 608 P.2d 635,
638 (1980) (statutory authorization unnecessary because general jurisdiction sufficed to
authorize sterilization); note 59 infra (defining parens patriae power).
"' See generally Courts' Authority, supra note 18, at 882-83. Parens patriae power
refers to the court's general guardianship powers over those persons suffering from legal
disabilities, such as incompetents. Id. The court may invoke the power whenever necessary
to protect the interests of an incompetent. Id. at 882.
'o See generally id. at 883-84. Substituted judgment, or substituted consent, allows a
court to do what the retardate would have done if he had had the legal capacity.Id. In sterilization cases, substituted judgment would provide a broader range of options than the court's
parens patriae power. See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 260, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981)
(substituted judgment allowed court to authorize sterilization whereas parens patriae
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interpretation of general statutory authority in light of the court's traditional equity powers." The majority of courts hold, however, that none
of these alternative bases for jurisdiction over the retardate allow the
court to authorize sterilization.2
Against this background of reluctance to authorize sterilizations of
mental retardates, two state supreme courts found jurisdiction to approve a sterilization operation without express statutory authority. In
In re C.D.M.,64 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a lower court finding
of no jurisdiction, and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider
the holding in light of judicially created standards for sterilization of incompetents."
The court recognized that the majority of cases held against granting sterilization petitions because of a lack of jurisdiction absent express
statutory authority.6 The Alaska Supreme Court criticized the majority
approach, however, for confusing the issues of jurisdiction and the con7
stitutionality of any authorization to sterilize the retardate.
Characterizing the finding of no jurisdiction as an abdication of judicial
responsibility,6 the C.D.M. court defined the lower court's general
jurisdiction as encompassing the power to hear all controversies, except
those expressly and unequivocally denied by the Alaska Constitution or
statutes.9
power would not have). Under parens patriae power the court only may authorize
therapeutic sterilizations, while substituted judgment allows the court to authorize elective
sterilizations as well. Cf. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147-49 (Ky. App. 1969) (court
authorized elective and medically unnecessary kidney transplant to save the life of the
retardate's brother). The courts largely have ignored the substituted judgment doctrine in
deciding sterilization cases. But see note 86 infra (Grady court may have invoked
substituted judgment while calling its authority by another name).
E See, e.g., In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269,_, 414 A.2d 541, 542 (1980); In re Simpson,
180 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962). See generally Courts' Authority, supra note 18, at
884-85. In Simpson, the judge read a general statute granting the court the power to provide
for care and maintenance of noninstitutionalized retardates as encompassing the power to
authorize sterilization. 180 N.E.2d at 208. Simpson has received much criticism. See, e.g.,
Burgdorf, supra note 3, at 1006; Ferster, supranote 3, at 608.
12 See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 260-62, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981) (recognizing, but
not following, majority rule of no jurisdiction or power to authorize sterilization); note 6
supra. One commentator speculates that the courts' reluctance to authorize sterilization
could arise from the threat of civil liability for the judge under Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356
F. Supp. 380, 382-83 (S.D. Ohio 1973), a sensitivity to the rights of retardates, or an unwillingness to usurp legislative power. See Courts' Authority, supra note- 18, at 887 n.53.
' In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261-62, 426
A.2d 467, 481 (1981).
627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981).
Id. at 613-14.
, Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 610.

'7

Id at 611.
Id. at 610. At least one other court explicitly held that general jurisdiction encompasses all controversies except matters specifically forbidden by statute. In re Eberhardy,
102 Wis. 2d 539, 548-51, 307 N.W.2d 881, 885-86 (1981).
"
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The court analogized the use of a: court of general jurisdiction's inherent parenspatriae power to authorize sterilization to other decisions
authorizing elective surgery or medical treatment. 0 The court declared
that in some instances, sterilization presently may be in the minor retardate's best interests.7' Therefore, a court of general jurisdiction had
the ability, under its parens patriae power, to authorize a sterilization
procedure. 2 The Alaska Supreme Court then remanded the case for
reconsideration of the petition in light of newly created judicial stand73
ards governing a grant of authority for such an operation.
In a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case, In re Grady,74 the court
similarly found jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of a mental retardate in some situations. 75 The court reviewed the individual right of
privacy afforded by both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, and concluded that every person has both the right to procreate
and the right not to procreate.70 Finding that mental retardation precluded exercise of either right by the retardate, 77 the Grady court sought
some other basis for consent.7"
The Grady court focused on the question of who should exercise that
right for the retardate. The court held that under a substituted judgment theory,79 parents may assert the retardate's right not to procreate
subject to a final determination by a court. 0 The court reserved the
"power to review" in an adversary proceeding the parental decision to
sterilize the retardate.8' This power to review gives the court considerable control over sterilization of retardates.2 After Grady, the retard70 In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 611 nn.10-14 (Alaska 1981) (citing case support).
71 Id. at 611. The Alaska court confused therapeutic and elective sterilizations, citing

support that would allow elective sterilizations, but invoking the best interest requirement
of parens patriae power, under which the court may authorize only therapeutic operations.
Id.; see note 45 supra (difference between the therapeutic and elective sterilizations detailed).
72 627 P.2d at 611.
7 Id. at 612-14. The C.D.M. sterilization standards substantially follow the standards
enumerated in In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467, 482-83 (1981), see note 91 infra,
but vary to some extent. One difference concerns the time frame for consideration of
whether sterilization is the only practicable means of contraception. CompareIn re C.D.M.,
627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska), with In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,'266, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981).
C.D.M. requires only that sterilization be the best alternative at the time of the judicial proceeding. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska 1981). Grady, however, looks to future
medical breakthroughs as well. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 266, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981).
85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
7 Id. at 259, 426 A.2d at 479.
78 Id. at 247-50, 426 A.2d at 473-75; see note 1 supra (origin of right to privacy).
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-50, 426 A.2d 467, 473-75 (1981). The retardate in Grady
could not exercise her right to sterilization because she could neither comprehend pregnancy nor the effects of sterilization. Id. at 247, 426 A.2d at 473. See text accompanying notes 5,
12-14 supra.
7' 85 N.J. at 251, 426 A.2d at 475.
7' See note 60 supra.
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 251, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (1981).
"Id.
8 Id. at 251 n.5, 426 A.2d at 475 n.5.
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ate's parents' may initiate sterilization proceedings but only the court
may give final approval.' The Grady court effectively held that only a
court may exercise a retardate's right not to procreate."
In a thorough discussion of possible bases of jurisdiction, similar to
the analysis employed in In re C.D.M., the Grady court found the power
to authorize sterilizations ostensibly under its parens patriae jurisdiction. The court found jurisdiction87 even while recognizing that the
majority of courts had held otherwise." Criticizing those cases for failing
to protect the constitutional rights of incompetents,89 the court took on
the responsibility of providing the retardate
with a choice by .exercising
0
that choice in the retardate's behalf.
As in In re C.D.M., the Grady court set forth explicit standards to
determine whether to authorize sterilization of the retardate. 1 These
See id. at 251, 426 A.2d at 475.
See id.
627 P.2d 607, 611 (Alaska 1981).
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 259-62, 426 A.2d 467, 479-81 (1981). The Grady court
misclassified the source of its jurisdiction. Although justifying jurisdiction as an exercise of
its parens patriae power, id., the court cited two substituted judgment cases for authority.
Id. at 260, 426 A.2d at 480 (citing Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368,_ 289 A.2d 386, 388
(Super. Ct. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Ky. App. 1969)). The doctrine of
substituted judgment derives from the court's parens patriae power but allows the court
greater latitude in substituting its judgment for that of its ward. See note 60 supra. Under
the traditional view of parens patriaepower, the court may authorize only that action which
is in the ward's best interests. See Ferster, supra note 3, at 608 (calling use of parens
patriaepower to authorize sterilization a novel power without historical basis). Substituted
judgment, however, allows the court to authorize what the ward would have done had he
the capacity to do so, enabling the court to recognize motivations other than medical
necessity. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Ky. App. 1969). Strunk involved a
request to authorize a kidney transplant from a retardate to his brother. Id. at 146. From
the retardate's viewpoint, the operation entailed some risk with no possible benefit. Id. The
only benefit to the retardate concerned the indirect psychological gain of having a live
brother. Id The kidney transplant, though clearly what the retardate would have wanted
had he the competence to consent, could not be authorized utilizing the court's parens
patriae power. See generally Courts' Authority, supra note 18.
" In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 259-62, 426 A.2d 467, 479-"1 (1981). The Grady court relied
heavily on In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Quinlan
involved the right of a person to refuse treatment on behalf of an incompetent ward. Id. at
22, 355 A.2d at 651. Detaching the respirator keeping the ward breathing presumably would
have caused the ward's death. See id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655. The court allowed the ward's
parents to detach the respirator, utilizing the court's parens patriae power to authorize
what the ward would have desired had she been competent. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 664. The
Quinlan court did not address specifically the issue of jurisdiction, instead merely stating
that New Jersey courts commonly grant declaratory relief. Id. at 34-35, 355 A.2d at 660.
8 In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 260-62, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981); see note 6 supra.
n In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981).
Id. at 261, 426 A.2d at 481.
9' Id. at 264-67, 426 A.2d at 482-83; see In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-13 (Alaska 1981).
The Grady standards set forth a detailed analysis of whether sterilization is presently in the
retardate's best interests. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467, 482-83 (1981).
Under Grady, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the retardate in a
full adversary proceeding. Id. Besides hearing evidence from both the petitioner and the
guardian ad litem, the court should obtain independent medical and psycholgocial profiles of

WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. XXXIX

standards include procedural safeguards to insure adequate representation of the retardate" and full consideration of the retardate's interests
and need for sterilization. 3 The Grady court declared that the
retardate's interests controlled whether the lower court should authorize sterilization. 4 The court recognized a court of general jurisdiction's
power to authorize sterilization of a mental retardate, but only if the
petitioners clearly and convincingly prove that sterilization furthers the
retardate's best interests."
In re C.D.M. and In re Grady did not appreciably advance the cause
of the mental retardate seeking sterilization because those courts' standards are prohibitive. Although the Grady and C.D.M. courts decided
that a court of general jurisdiction. could authorize sterilization," the cir-

cumstances under which a court could find such authorization appropriate have proved stringent. On remand, the lower court in Grady
denied authorization for sterilization of the retardate. The Grady standthe retardate. Id. The judge should meet with the retardate to elicit his or her views on procreation and sterilization, and to judge first hand the retardate's degree of incompetency.
Id.
To authorize sterilization, the Grady court required a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the retardate lacks the capacity to consent to sterilization now and forever,
and that sterilization is in the retardate's best interests. Id. When making the best interest
determination, the court should consider a number of factors. Id. The court should weigh
the possibility of pregnancy, a fact which may be presumed given normal sexual development. Id. The court should determine the likelihood of sexual intercourse, the present and
future inability of the retardate to understand reproduction or contraception, present and
future alternative means of contraception, and the present versus future advisability of
sterilization. Id. In addition, the trial court should consider the present and future ability of
the retardate to care for a child, either alone or with a spouse's help, and the possibility of
scientific advances in the treatment of retardation or in sterilization procedures. Id. Finally,
the court should be reasonably certain of the good faith of the petitioners seeking the
sterilization authorization. Id.
" See note 91 supra. Because of the open and adversary nature of the sterilization
hearing, deception such as that revealed in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), in
which the retardate's mother and doctor told the retardate that she was to have an appendectomy, will be reduced. Id. at 353.
'"

See note 91 supra.

In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981).,
"5Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483.
As interpreted by the trial court on remand, under the standards mandated by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, see note 91 supra, the petitioner must show the likelihood of
sexual activity in the near future. In re Grady, No. C-1917-78E, slip op. at 6 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., August 3, 1981). Unless the retardate faces a risk of pregnancy, sterilization
should not take place. Id. One questions whether sterilization would occur too late to prevent pregnancy. Because sterilization- is meant to prevent pregnancy, the more appropriate
method would be to sterilize the retardate before the risk of pregnancyarises. See In re
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 609, 307 N.W.2d 881, 913 (1981) (Callow, J., dissenting)
(speculating whether previously having denied sterilization requests, court could authorize
abortions for pregnant mental retardates).
" In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981), In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261-62, 426
A.2d 467, 481 (1981).
See In re Grady, No. C-1917-78E, slip op. at 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., August 3,
1981). On remand, the trial court in Grady recognized that the issue involved the interplay
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ards require a difficult showing before anyone may exercise the retardate's elective sterilization rights.9 Although a court acknowledging
jurisdiction seems better than no forum at all, if the court imposes a
heavy burden of persuasion before a retardate's parents or guardian
may obtain authorization to proceed with sterilization, such a court affords little real relief.
Cases and commentators have offered suggested standards for
determining when sterilization is appropriate."' Such proffered standards generally detail who may consent to the sterilization, the showing
required for sterilization authorization, and the procedural safeguards
necessary to counter abuse of the sterilization process."' Retardate
sterilization standards are best left to individual state legislatures, 02
which may consider the problems and solutions in an unemotional and
unhurried manner. In re Grady and In re C.D.M. represent a courageous
step forward, but they are in the minority of jurisdictions appropriatily
addressing the need for standards defining when retardates may elect
sterilization.
ALAN B. MUNRO
of two aspects of the right of privacy. Id. at 5-6. The court must weigh the right to procreate
against the right-to freedom from the intense supervision required to protect an unsterilized
retardate from pregnancy. Id. The court found that sterilization would infringe less on the
retardate's right of privacy than supervision in the long run, but that presently supervision
was in the retardate's best interest. Id. Therefore, the court refused to authorize sterilization. Id at 6.
" See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 276, 426 A.2d 467, 488 (1981) (Handler, J., concurring).
Judge Handler called the showing required before the court could authorize sterilization
"stringent" and possibly too difficult for any retardate to meet. Id. at 275, 426 A.2d at 487.
110Wyatt v. Anderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384-86 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (court took judicial
notice that even though illegal, doctors continued to perform involuntary sterilizations, so
court set up standards for those sterilizations); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-13 (Alaska
1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 262-67, 426 A.2d 467, 481-83 (1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d
228, 237-39, 608 P.2d 635, 639-41 (1980); Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 464-71; Sterilization,
supra note 2, at 405-07.
"Io Compare Neuwirth, supra note 4, at 464-71, with Sterilization, supra note 2, at
405-07, with In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467, 482-83 (1981); with VA. CODE §§
54-325.10 to -325.12 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
102In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881, 895 (1981). See Note, Rights
of Mentally Ill-Involuntary Sterilization-Analysisof Recent Statutes, 78 W. VA. L. REv.
131, 144 (1976). A number of courts inferentially support legislative solutions to the sterilization of retardates issue by sympathizing with the petitioner before denying the requested
relief. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 311 (Ala. 1979) (court reluctantly denied petition); Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 271 (Cal. App.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979) (court sympathized with petitioner's cause but declined to encroach upon province of legislature by granting authorization absent enabling
legislation); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977) (judge convinced that sterilization
was in best interests of retardate but refused to grant authorization without express
legislative authority because of lack of judicial immunity). Some states recently have
enacted statutes prescribing standards for the voluntary sterilization of retardates. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-128 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (addressing sterilization of adult
retardates); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.10 to -325.12 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

